History of Emergency Management

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and Home Finance Agency (1951-1952), to the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1943-1958), to the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization (1958-1962), to the Office of Emergency Planning (1962-1974), and then eventually to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1974-1979) (Platt, 2006). Whichever agency maintained ultimate responsibility for emergency management, the fact remains that federal emergency management was not a high priority. Tasks were shuffled between various federal agencies, responsibilities were shared, and no entity had disaster response as its primary responsibility. The deficiencies of this system were not immediately apparent or at least not immediately addressed since the system worked relatively well for small to moderate disasters. In the 1970s, however, one catastrophic disaster and one near-catastrophic disaster forced a significant reevaluation of the federal disaster response system. In June 1972 Hurricane Agnes struck the east coast of the United States killing 122 people and causing more than $10 billion in damage in 2005 dollars (Miskel, 2006). It caused more damage in Pennsylvania than any disaster before or since (Miskel, 2006). Time magazine even referred to the storm as “the most ravaging storm in U.S. history (Time Magazine, 1972). In response, the federal government declared seven states – Florida, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia – disaster zones. While Ohio and West Virginia simply requested and received federal reimbursements, the remaining five states requested federal assistance in distributing food and water to tens of thousands of people. Approximately, 20,000 Pennsylvania residents, 17,000 New York residents, and 10,000 Maryland and Virginia residents had to flee their homes due to the flooding. The relief efforts were characterized by mass confusion. State and local governments were not well prepared to handle the disasters, and there was an overall lack of coordination between federal, state, local, and non-governmental organizations. On June 26, the third day of the storm, the governors of New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania met in Harrisburg to discuss the inadequacies of the federal relief (Montgomery, 1972). The meeting took place a day after President Nixon conducted the traditional flyover of a disaster site. As result of this highly public summit and the political pressures it applied, on June 26, President Nixon directed all federal agencies to “provide all Federal assistance needed, and do it immediately by cutting through red tape (Washington Post, 1972). On June 27, he further directed Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to conduct a tour of the disaster stricken regions to “make sure Federal officials are cooperating fully (New York Times, 1972). The vice president discovered that federal disaster relief to people who had lost their homes in the storm was not adequate (Miskel, 2006). On July 4, ten days after the storm made landfall, disaster victims were still waiting in line at the Red Cross for temporary housing. The flow of information was inadequate and local governments were given conflicting information about which expenses would be reimbursed by the federal government (Platt, 2006). While media coverage in the 1970s was generally more passive and less provocative than today’s round-the-clock anxiety provoking reports, the storm, nonetheless, received extensive coverage given the other concurrent world events such as the Vietnam War and its anti-war protests. Despite media attention, however, thousands of disaster victims were still living in federal trailers one year later. The disaster response system simply failed on all accounts.

Due to the concerns raised by the response to Hurricane Agnes, the National Governors Association, a bipartisan organization of state governors, set up a commission to analyze the state and federal response system. The commission issued a policy statement recommending a consolidation of federal emergency preparedness responsibilities into one agency. One year later, the commission published an academic study with the same recommendations. This study also concluded, although in somewhat kinder terms, that states were not prepared to adequately handle their disaster response responsibilities (Platt, 2006). Although the federal government had begun to evaluate its disaster preparedness no major changes were made before the next major activation of the ailing disaster response system seven years later. In March of 1979, a nuclear accident titled “the most serious” accident since the inception of the American commercial nuclear power industry took place at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. One of the two nuclear reactors in the electrical plant underwent a partial core meltdown. Although there were no serious injuries or deaths directly linked to the Three Mile Island accident, the magnitude of the incident has had a long-lasting effect on nuclear regulations in the United States. The near disaster sparked public apprehensions about the safety of nuclear technology that persist to this day. While the Three Mile Island incident was caused by a nuclear accident rather than a natural disaster, the event nonetheless, caused widespread destruction that displaced thousands of people from their damaged homes on public infrastructure. Thus, it required the activation of the same disaster response system that was proven inadequate during Hurricane Agnes. The response to the Three Mile Island incident raised so many serious questions that President Richard Nixon immediately established a high-level commission to examine the causes of, preparedness for, and response to the incident.

Six months later in October 1979 the commission issued its official report which stated: The response to the emergency was dominated by an atmosphere of almost total confusion.

There was a lack of communication at all levels. Many key recommendations were made by individuals who were not in possession of accurate information and those who managed the accident were slow to realize the significance and implications of the events that had taken place (Miskel, 2006). It is no mystery why the response to the disaster was inadequate. In a report issued by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) following the accident, it was noted that Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Radiation Protection which was responsible for developing emergency plans for nuclear facilities and the surrounding areas failed to prepare adequate plans. The bureau submitted a draft plan to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1975 but the plan was rejected and returned to the bureau for modification. Although the plan was revised, four years later when the nuclear accident occurred, it was still never resubmitted