Virtue Ethics

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It is notable to mention that virtue ethics and moral particularism do not consider moral thought to be different from normal thought; it does not have a distinctive structure[7]. As we have already established, both virtue ethics and moral particularism completely refute absolute principles, both doctrines deem that absolute principles fail in evaluating the morality of an action if the action contains one or more absolute principles that contradict the first. The doctrines also reject the generalist view of contributory principles evaluating the morality of an action in the same manner in each action. Dancy writes: “The core of particularism is its insistence on variability” (Dancy, 2013)[8]. He adds: “A feature can make one moral difference in one case, and a different difference in another. Features have, as we might put it, variable relevance.” (Dancy, 2013)[9]. What is meant is that the morality of an action depends on the morality of many features such as; the intention, the motivation, who the action is directed towards (if directed towards someone), the consequence. Those features listed are not the only ones that are taken into account an action could have more or less of those features depending on what it is. For example, if I were to punch someone the consequence of me punching him or her would be that they would get violent towards me. Perhaps if I that person were being violent towards me beforehand, the consequence of my action would be that they would get scared. If I take the action out of that context completely, lets say I was punching a punching bag, two of the features I mentioned above such as consequence and who the action is directed towards, would be completely irrelevant in evaluating the morality of such an action, “In ethics, a feature that makes one action better can make another one worse, and make no difference at all to a third.” (Dancy, 2013)[10]. Even though both virtue ethics and moral particularism agree on what we have just mentioned with regards to features that decide morality of an action. Aristotle has established an exception to this in virtue ethics; he ascertains one contributory principle that he applies in the same way in all ethical situations. We could say that he would ignore the first principle of Kant’s deontological ethics, which is lying, however he would find a place in his doctrine for the second principle that is self-preservation. He says “ The magnanimous man does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because he honors few things; but he will face dangers, and when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life” (Casey, 1991)[11]. Conversely, There are no exceptions to the rules of moral particularism, and so we can say as much as the doctrine allows room for different evaluation of moral action as much as it is rigid because it hardly makes any expectations. Would moral particularism claim that suicide could be moral as long as it is justifiable in a specific circumstance?

Finally, both doctrines approve that virtue is objective. Aristotle describes pride as the “crown of the virtues” (Casey, 1991)[12]. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Aristotle claims that the motive virtue behind every moral action is pride; perhaps it could be mercy, justice, wisdom, etc. What Aristotle is claiming is that pride is the virtue that overwhelms all other virtues, because all other virtues are means to the crown virtue. The highest virtue is having pride in your virtuous character. Moral particularism considers the motive behind all morally good action to be virtue, without specifying or ranking the virtues and so all virtues in moral particularism are one and the same, united under the term virtue. In order for us to consider virtue ethics a form of moral particularism, virtue ethics will have to adopt an inflexible version of the unity of virtues, and that would certainly cause great change to the doctrine of virtue ethics.

All in all, we have covered the common grounds between virtue ethics and moral particularism to show they are often confused as one and the same thing. The common grounds are undoubtedly the reason for their regular association with each other. Moreover the essay has also demonstrated the major conflicts between the doctrines highlighting why virtue ethics is more flexible, practical and adaptable when taught as an ethical doctrine.

Bibliography:

- Dancy, J. (2013) Moral Particularism. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/#TwoConMorPr

- Available at: https://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/aristotle/Ethics.pdf

- Casey, J. (1991) Pagan virtue. Oxford University Press, USA.

- Crisp, R. (ed.) (1998) How should one live? Essays on the virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Flanagan, K. and Jupp, P.C. (eds.) (2000) Virtue ethics and sociology: Issues of modernity and religion. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Bennett, C. (2015) What is this thing called ethics? London: Taylor and Francis(Routledge).

- Gardiner, S.M. (ed.) (2005) Virtue ethics, old and new. United States: Cornell University Press

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