How the Zombie Argument Functions and Why It Cannot Ease the Problem Between Physicalism and Dualism

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happens to be a brain process... in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes.” (Smart 190-192)

Smart argues that Jackson has not really demonstrated anything by saying that we cannot understand the “hurtfulness of pains” through physical information. The fact that “hurtfulness” is a sensation is not an argument by itself. Smart argues that this process of feeling hurtfulness (a sensation) is identical to the process of feeling pain (a brain-process).

The fact that zombiescannot experience the “hurtfulness of pains” indicates that it simply lacks the brain-process to do so. It feels neither hurt nor pain as a physical phenomenon. Smart argues that is not that physicalism, as a theory, is missing a vital part of humanity, but rather that the zombie argument is not conceivable at all and is invalid. An epiphenomenalist could quickly reply that the conditions of the zombie argument assume that such a being is possible, and that physicalism would fail to work under those conditions. Smart’s response then, according to an epiphenomenalist, does not even address the thought experiment and is not a response at all. Presupposing this argument, Smart prefaces his paper by addressing what he calls “nomological danglers.”

“That everything should be explicable in terms of physics ... except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable. Such sensations would be ‘nomological danglers’ ... they have a queer ‘smell’ to them. I am just unable to believe in the nomological danglers themselves, or in the laws whereby they would dangle. If any philosophical arguments seemed to compel us to believe in such things, I would suspect a catch in the argument.” (191)

If dualists need to bend the laws of physics to create an argument, then their argument should be categorically rejected. A physicalist can use data from the material world to prove their point. If a physicalist points to a dead person, which is an object that we are certain does not experience consciousness, they can also point to their lack of brain-processes. Similarly, if a physicalist points to a person with a coma, whose consciousness is limited, even though it is difficult to be certain about this they could again point to the lack of brain activity. Until a dualist can point to material evidence of this sort, physicalists will not be discouraged.

At this point, one might notice that no conclusion to this problem has been reached. Dualists and physicalists do not tackle each other’s contentions. It would be impossible to do so; the two interpretations are mutually exclusive. Physicalism are quite concrete: material data relies on the laws of physics to understand humans. Dualism obviously does not (and cannot) cannot be that straightforward, because they specifically propose something non-physical. Both theories debates come equipped with their own set of epistemological assumptions, which prevent any substantial interaction between the two.

The first fault lies in the Zombie Argument itself. It structures the premises and conclusion in a way that creates questions and results in circular reasoning. The Zombie Argument subtracts consciousness from its physically identical zombies to prove that consciousness is a non-physical phenomenon. It assumes that consciousness could “conceivably” be a non-physical entity. It then questions physicalists who could obviously not answer it and remain faithful to their ideas. Instead, physicalists choose to ignore the basic assumptions of dualism and carry out the argument on their terms. Dennett’s entire case against the zombie argument rests on the idea that consciousness arises from physical and evolutionary roots. He comments on the qualia of “hurting pains and sexy feelings” and traces their presence in humans to evolutionary/physical roots. Given that the zombies are physically identical, Dennett argues that they would have developed the same qualia, and ultimately have what would become consciousness (Dennet 1995). The thought experiment does not ask for a biological or evolutionary history of these phenomena, but only assumes that they are absent. Smart follows similar thread by tying qualia to brain processes, and stating that if zombies were to lack one they would lack the other. This would make them physically dissimilar and fail the thought experiment. This would also ignore the command of the argument (to assume absence of qualia) and ignore its implicit assumption: that qualia are non-physical and cannot be attached to brain processes. Ultimately, Smart chooses to attack the notion of a thought experiment, (or

“nomological danglers”) rather than address the content of the argument.

In the philosophy of mind, it is difficult to discern between what is science and what is philosophy. Physicalists such as Smart, by referencing neurons, brain processes and the laws of physics rely on material, scientific data to prove their theories. Dualists require thought experiments and formally logical arguments. Their arguments are clearer in the philosophical camp. Dualists don not rely on what is there, but what focus on what cannot be explained instead. They do not interpret what is or is not, but what could be (conceivable). Because these schools have different epistemic values, because they value different types of knowledge, they cannot meet in a debate. Finally, the zombie argument fails to defuse the problem because it cannot engage the physicalists on their level.

In conclusion, the zombie argument is not a successful argument against physicalists. Because Physicalism and Dualism have completely different epistemological assumptions, they cannot engage with each other effectively. The argument comes down to whether one views a thought experiment as valuable. Physicalists will absolutely deny what stretches the laws of physics, and Dualists will pursue them for not responding to the experiment itself. Until the Physicalists reach a scientific breakthrough, the debate will only go on and on.

Work Cited:

Dennet, C Daniel: “The Unimagined Preposterousnes of Zombies.” Journal of Consciousness

Jackson, Frank. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." Philosophical Quarterly (1982): 127-36. Print.

Philosophical Papers. Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1987. 189-202. Print.

Physicalism."Metaphysics. Boulder: Westview, 1993. 166-74. Print.

Smart, J. J. C. "Sensations and Brain Processes." Essays Metaphysical and Moral: Selected

Studies,