A Theistic Argument for the Problem of Evil

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If god is morally indifferent, then this could logically be the best of all worlds even with the presence of evil and suffering as we know them. While the world seems to operate on systems of subjective morality, it would actually operate on some sort of grey-objective morality that viewed all actions as equal to each other.

While this may appear to be a sound rejection of the problem of evil, it deliberately fails to address the problem of evil in an adequate way for it to be a solution. Instead of presenting a claim that can logically explain the existence of evil, this rejection functions much more like a temporary suspension of belief in evil and actually ends up alienating theists from popular doctrines of what they widely accept to be permissible moral behavior.

This argument against the problem of evil works so well, because it is able to deny that there is a problem at all. I argue however, that the problem of evil still remains; for example, just because someone with cancer is able to deny that they have cancer, it still exists in there body. For theists the problem is much the same when talking about the problem of evil, solutions are either not adequate solutions, or fail to address the problem all together. And still “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”- David Hume

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