Garrett Court Case Memo

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not central to a resident’s domestic life (Garrett, 110). The court stated that activities that occur in a parking garage, such as storing one’s car and car paraphernalia, are not typically done in a room in a house (Garrett, 110).

INSERT GARRETT FACTS TO CONTRAST?

In the Fenton case, a court would likely conclude that the basement is used for activities central to domestic life because it houses the apartment’s laundry facilities. (Garrett, 110; Correia, 356; Davids, 115). Laundry would be considered a domestic activity akin to storing frozen and canned food, or watching television or reading because they are typically done in the room of a home (Correia, 356; Davids, 115). An argument could be made that because bicycles are also stored in the basement it should not be considered an area central to domestic life. The shed in Davids, however, not only stored frozen foods and canned goods, but also other tools which are not typically stored in the home (Davids, 115). As such, there is no reason to believe that secondary uses of a location will reverse its designation as central to domestic life.

Lastly, the courts require that that the area or structure beyond the main habitation be easily accessible. A place is easily accessible when the totality of the structure in question’s physical relationship to the main residence makes it an extension of the main residence (Garrett, 110; Correia, 356; Davids, 115). Two factors describe totality: distance from the main habitation and nature of the route used to get to the structure in question. This gives residents a sense of protection similar to what they would feel in a main house, which contributes to the reasonable perception that the area is part of the dwelling unit.

In Correia, the court found that a summer house was easily accessible because of its physical relationship to the rooms in the main house. To reach the summer house, the residents would go through a door on the west wall of the living room and along an enclosed, screened walkway for about 10 feet, and then through a screen door directly into the front room of the summer house. Similarly, in Davids the court reasoned that a shed was easily accessible because of its physical relationship to the main residence, which made it an extension of the main habitation. To enter this shed, the residents of the Gibb home exit through a door located on the east wall of the kitchen and walk about six feet outside to the door of the shed. However, in Garrett, a garage was deemed not easily accessible because the totality of its physical relationship to the living units. To reach the garage, tenants had to walk a substantial distance by a convoluted route in part outside: they had to leave their apartments, exit the building through the lobby, cross a private walkway, and walk part way around the tennis court. Thus, a person would not reasonably perceive the garage to be an extension of the dwelling unit.

In the Fenton case, a court would likely conclude that

In the Fenton case, a court may also