The Alawi Community in the Syrian Civil War

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Alawites began to assert themselves in conventional Syrian political life, assuring their governance by transforming themselves from a ‘…socially and economically backward religious minority, to an emancipated group of significant power.’

• The consolidation of a Baathist Syria

• 1946: Independence of Syria unstable coup-prone state

• 1946-1963: Alawites sought involvement in many aspects of society: participated in the political and ideological ferment post-independence

• Alawi rise to power through army and government ranks in the 1960s

• 9 March 1963: Baathist coup d’état

• Hinnebusch: The Baath regime started as an ‘army-party symbiosis’, fronted by a Sunni general but heavily minoritarian (Alawites, Druze…) the key to survival was initially to control the army, to coup-proof the state: out of poverty, it is mostly Alawites who chose this route

• Internal split within the Baath party between the older more moderate faction (who sought the integration of Sunni figures) and the more radical faction (socialist revolution against the urban centre): ousting of the moderates in a 1966 coup, but intra-party rivalry continued

• 13 November 1970: Hafez Al Assad’s military coup d’etat Hafez Al Assad becomes Syria’s first non-Sunni President in 1971

• Focus on urbanisation and education to overcome Alawi backwardness: migration to the coast and Aleppo, Homs and Damascus

• 1963-1971: Baath party rise to power: socialist revolution which benefited rural minorities like the Alawites and forged cross-sectarian coalitions based on class and ideology culmination with the presidency of Hafez Al Assad

• Alawi rule in Syria: 1970-2011

Daniel Pipes: “An Alawi ruling Syria is like an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia – an unprecedented development shocking to the majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries”

Bashar al-Assad: “We have more difficult circumstances than most Arab countries but in spite of that Syria is stable”

• To what extent was Syria governed by the Alawi minority from 1970 to 2011?

Despite the worldwide surge of nationalism and popular sovereignty, that has given rise to the modern nation-state and a corollary shift from dominant minority rule to dominant majority rule, power in Syria has remained in the hands of the Alawi ethnic minority. The Alawi minority account for just 12% of Syria’s population, and yet have officially governed Syria since Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970.

Ibn Khaldoun: ‘A ruler can achieve power only with the help of his people. They are his group and his helpers in his enterprise. He uses them to fight against those who revolt against his dynasty.

Hafez utilised the solidarity of the Alawi minority in his governance of Syria to ensure a stable regime, and thus dominated the Ba’ath party, army and security agencies with members of the Alawi community, whereas Bashar neglected the Alawi minority and instead relied on members of the Assad-Ahkras family to fill governing positions: The neglect of the Ba’ath party, Syria’s supreme political institution, and the army, Syria’s informal governing institution, mean that it cannot be argued that the Alawites governed Syria to a great extent under the Bashar al-Assad regime.

• The predominance of the Alawi minority in Syria’s governance apparatus has ensured the consolidation of the Assad rule and its post-2011 survival: rather than arguing they have played a role in governing Syria per se, which was mainly owed to the Assad-constructed and fluctuating ruling coalition (crony capitalists and family ties, more than religious affinities), the operationalisation of religious differences in the military apparatus (Shabiha, NDF) played a crucial role in solidifying the regime’s coercive apparatus post-2011 and by linking the Alawites’ survival to the longevity of the regime, ensured its resilience

• During Hafez’s presidency it is arguably more accurate to surmise that the country was governed by Arab nationalists. Hafez’s inner circle and the Regional Command not only included Alawis but also included a significant number of Damascene Sunnis. Due to the President’s focus on foreign policy, the Regional Command was subsequently given significant legislative agency, particularly in economic affairs, through which it could influence the governance of the country. Furthermore, Hafez’s commitment to a Nasserist ideology and focus on land reforms to endear the rural population and breakdown class division, strengthens his Arab nationalist credentials.

• Basher’s presidency, similarly cannot claim to be the governance of the Alawite minority, but for rather different reasons. Basher’s inner circle was notable, not for its cross-sectional appearance, but rather how it concentrated power in the hands of an elite few — those with a close familial and tribal connection to the President. Widespread corruption and raging inequality has, much as Ibn Khaldun’s prophesied six centuries ago, led to the regime effectively abandoning its central pillar and consequently devastating the Alawi community’s once strong assabiyya. As a result, from 2000 to 2011, Syria was in no way governed by the Alawi minority, but instead it was governed by a nepotistic oligarchy.

• To such an extent that the country was by no means governed by the Alawi minority, but rather governed by a small baron class united by their familial and tribal connections

Oded Haklai’s theory on the consolidation of power by minority sects highlights 3 necessary conditions:

• A ruling minority group must have suffered a collective experience of persecution that has led to group cohesion and loyalty

• Through colonial legacy the necessary circumstances to enable a minority group to seek and attain political power will have developed

• The minority group will use an authoritative government structure and dominate its institutions in order to ensure their continued rule.

Leon Goldsmith: The Alawis have ‘…been subject to the same repressive political climate as the rest of the population, and so, may feign support for the regime out of necessity.’