General Will and Rousseau

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good makes itself so manifestly evident”.14 If we believe this assertion to be true, then mere discussion and deliberation on the common good in the public assembly would make the notion of General Will clear to the people with dissenting opinions and solve the issue of disparity and not having unanimity. This view is also held by Elster. He says that under deliberation “there would not be any need for an aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences”.15

Yet instead of letting the ‘Majority’ explain the general will to those in dissent, Rousseau resorts to using the phrase, “the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails...and that what I thought to be the general will was not so.” 16 and says that those who do not obey the general will will be “forced to be free”. The paradox to be noted in the case of a situation of dissent is, that the notion which was supposed to comprise of generality and unanimity, ends up being the will of the Majority and those in dissent are forced to come in alignment with the will of the majority. Even if we believe that this forced alignment of views is correct since it comes from someone who has advocated the importance of free will throughout,

13 Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought, Mark Phillip, Oxford, p 69 14 Book IV, The Social Contract, Rousseau, p 149

15 Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections, Elster, p 92

16 The Social Contract, Rousseau, Book IV, p 153

yet this assertion works on an inherent assumption that the decisions which the Majority makes in the absence of all deliberations, are always correct.

In order to analyse whether all decisions made by majority are correct, we look at the assertions given by Berlin. Berlin in the two concepts of liberty, highlights that people may not always know what they want. This idea of Berlin brings about a sense of understanding that the majority’s opinion on the general will might not always be correct and hence arbitrarily forcing people with dissents to come in conformity with the Majority’s opinion, doesn’t necessarily make sense. The Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act which was passed by President Hoover in 1930 is one of the most evident testimonies to the fact that at times Majority might not be fully aware of what the common good is. This Act raised raised US Tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels.17 While this act was in the process of getting passed, some people within Hoover’s own party voted against this bill saying that passing the act wasn’t a wise decision.18 When the act was passed the kind of retaliation which the government received to this act from international market was brutal and it ended with them passing the Reciprocal Act of 1934 in order to reverse things to the original status quo.19 In this situation both the majority and people in dissent were working towards the common good, but the majority ended up making the wrong decision. Even though I understand that the US government is not a direct reincarnation of the direct democracy which Rousseau wanted and that Rousseau was against the idea of representative democracy, but the essence which I am trying to put forward is that people may not always know what they want and the end result of Majority’s opinion of the general will might not always be correct. Hence a black and white characterisation of the

17 The Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C. ch. 4)

18 "Economists Against Smoot–Hawley", Econ Journal Watch, September 2007. 19 Enacted June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 1351

Majority always being able to determine the common good is falsifiable. In such scenarios forcing the people in dissent to align themselves with the opinion which stands after the voting, goes against the notion of voicing a pure form of general since at times even those in dissent might be competent judges.

Rousseau seems to be conscious of this issue when he says, “How can a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills, because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of legislation? ...The general will is always in the right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened. ... The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what it wills... This makes a legislator necessary.”20

Legislator

Rousseau describes the Legislator as ‘a superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men’.21 This legislator is supposed to have a command over laws and is supposed to raise public enlightenment. Even though the exact mandate of this legislator is ambiguous in Rousseau’s discourse, yet with the understanding which we have in the text, two basic issues are seen. First problem arises when the person officiating in the capacity of legislator in Rousseau’s political theatre misuses his power. This difficulty was seen in the French Revolution and the terror. Nanette Le Coat draws parallels between Robespierre’s position and Rousseau’s legislator22 and it has been argued by Mark Bevir that Robespierre mistook his own will for the General Will when Robespierre regarded opponents of his policies as opponents of the sovereign.23 Through this I do not wish to

20 Book 2, The Social Contract, Rousseau, p 83 21 Book 2, The Social Contract, Rousseau, p 84

22 Ironies of representation: The legislator in Rousseau, Robespierre, and Volney, Nannette Le Coat

23 Encyclopaedia of Political Theory: A - E, Mark Bevir, p 553

pass value judgements on what Robespierre did but highlight the fact that the position of legislator in Rousseau can be misused to great extents and can become a tool for exploitation. Second, the need and the presence of a legislator in Rousseau, creates a lot of inherent issues within The Social Contract. For instance, the recourse to a legislator can be considered in direct contradiction with Rousseau’s idea of autonomy of individuals. Honing correctly argues that “The lawgiver leads the citizens to a legitimate set of arrangements, but he also positions the citizens in a relation of heteronomy that is deeply at odds with Rousseauian legitimacy”.24 To add to that the need for public enlightenment on behalf of the legislator directly contradicts Rousseau’s notion of having no deliberation and no private communication since he himself believes the individuals