Continuity of Consciousness

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Meredith Michaels raises two different thought experiments in objection to Locke’s assertion that the body is not a key marker of personal identity. The ‘Schwanda dilemma’, wherein a person named Wanda’s brain is transplanted into the body of her friend, and neither set of parents wants to claim the resulting person. The person, who Michaels names Schwanda, has the memories of Wanda, and believes that she is Wanda, but the question that arises from this scenario becomes ‘is there any conclusive proof that she actually is Wanda, or has Schwanda simply been deluded into believing so?’ Michaels goes on to state that Locke’s reasoning that memories are the marker of identity is insufficient in this case, since the validity of Schwanda’s memory is what is being called into question.[17]

Michaels goes on to the ‘Dr Nefarious’ thought experiment, which supposes that the eponymous evil scientist has kidnapped you, and tells you that you will be horribly tortured the next day at a certain time, then tells you that five minutes before the torture, your memory of this conversation will be wiped. Dr Nefarious then goes on to tell you that he will in fact wipe all of your memories, and replace them with the memories of another. Michaels uses this example to draw out the conclusion that, no matter what state your mind will be in at the time, your body is still going to suffer horribly, and we have a natural aversion to that thought. Whether or not our bodies are truly the markers of our own personal identity over time, we still hold them as important to our own sense of self. Michaels uses both of these thought experiments together to show that there may be no all-or-nothing concept of self-identity, and that a more balanced approach may be necessary.[18]

Locke’s argument is certainly one that has historic significance in the field of philosophy, and it serves an important starting point for more nuanced ideas concerning continuity of consciousness. Locke’s argument, taken on its own merits, seems to be sound, and his conclusions are intuitive. This does not mean, however, that Locke’s proposition is not without problems when faced with a wider context and the weight of time. The objections brought up by Reid are important to note, despite the criticism that his view arises as a result of a different worldview than Locke’s. However, Michaels’ thought experiments make a strong case for the viewpoint that both Locke’s centrality of consciousness for continuing personal identity, and the idea that the physical is central, need a middle ground to work entirely in the face of both personal experience, and the scientific advances made in the study of the human mind since the time of Locke.

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Reference List

Blackburn, Simon. Think : A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy / Simon Blackburn. Oxford: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.

Locke, John. "Of Identity and Diversity (Extract) / John Locke." Oxford: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Michaels, Meredith W. "Persons, Brains, and Bodies (Extract) / Meredith W Michaels." Belmont: Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004.

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