Us, Soviet, and Cuban Intelligence During the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) intercepts was the method by which the United States had identified the military arms shipments to Cuba, due to the high communication traffic. Intelligence analysts amalgamated the information and provided a clear picture of the intentions of the adversary, never been seen before. This was a series of impressive accomplishments considering how much effort the Soviets had gone through to deceive the United States.

A major failure within the intelligence community was the inability to identify or locate other suspected missile sites. This was the largest contributor to the tension of the period. Intelligence personnel and policymakers were unaware that the Soviet Union had other sites already prepared and ready to engage. Most disturbing of all, the Kremlin had deployed tactical nuclear weapons, commonly known as frogs, and had provided the field commanders with the authority to fire if one American soldier set foot on a Cuban beach [Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999].

US Intelligence failed to realize that the Soviet deployment in Cuba was Two-pronged: (1) an unprecedented overseas deployment of a large Soviet Military expeditionary force, as well as (2) an equally unprecedented overseas deployment of strategic forces, medium and intermediate range missiles with thermonuclear warheads.[Raymond L Garthoff]

Should the US have not found out the missiles in Cuba, US would not have been able to secure the withdrawal of the missiles.

James R. Killian, Jr. report described the introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba as a "near-total intelligence surprise."[CIA, 1992]It concluded that the Intelligence Community's analysis of intelligence indicators and its production of current intelligence reports "failed to get across to key government officials the most accurate possible picture of what the Soviets might be up to in Cuba" during the months preceding 14 October. The report took the Community to task for inadequate early warning of hostile intentions and capabilities; failure to provide senior policymakers with meaningful, cumulative assessments of the available intelligence indicators; and failure to produce a revision of the erroneous National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 8-3-62) of 19 September 1962. [CIA, 1992]

Soviet Intelligence:

Soviet intelligence performed reasonably well during the crisis; however Soviet intelligence had its shortcomings. Khrushchev had a plan in place, to transport missiles, troops and other goods halfway across the world, undetected. The Soviets had two motives with regards to Cuba, to contribute to redressing the global strategic inferiority of the Soviet Union, and to deter an anticipated US attack on Cuba. [Garthoff]

Sometime in April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to develop Cuba into a nuclear base, and in mid-July Soviet shipments of conventional weapons and military equipment increased. Soviet government had one purpose, to bring Communism into the Western hemisphere.

The Soviets were able to launch a massive denial and deception campaign against the United States by placing the offensive missiles in Cuba. The fact that the Soviets were able to deploy the missiles halfway across the world undetected indicates an intelligence failure on the part of the United States.

The leadership of the Soviet Union went to extensive lengths to conceal all phases of the missile deployment. Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev only brought five military officers into the tight circle that was responsible for the planning of the operation. The actual operation itself was intended not only to deceive the United States and other foreign countries, but also to deceive Soviet officers themselves about the destination of the deployment [Hansen, 2002]

Operation ANADYR, was the codename for the missile deployment operation. Operation ANADYR gave the impression that the deployment was to the north because Anadyr was the name of a bomber base in the northern region of the USSR. Soviet troops were told that they were going to a cold place and that they needed to pack their cold weather gear. In addition to keeping the location of the deployment a secret, the Soviets went to great lengths to achieve the same amount of secrecy aboard the ships that were carrying the missiles. The ships that were headed to Cuba made false port declarations and also gave false destinations. The ships were loaded with civilian and agricultural equipment on the top decks while the missiles, equipment, and personnel were transported out of sight on the lower decks. The Military hardware such as missiles and launchers where shielded with metal sheets to defeat infrared photography [Gribkov and Smith, 1994]. Soldiers were only allowed to come to the top decks to get fresh air during the night under the cover of darkness. For the Soviets to go through great lengths to conceal the operation suggests that they must have had a great deal of information regarding the intelligence collection capability of the United States.

Once the missiles and associated equipment arrived in Cuba, the Soviets faced another challenge of trying to covertly deploy the missiles into the field. Soviets built large cinder-blocks wall around the unloading areas so that none of the port activity could be observed by land-based agents [ Brugioni, 1991]. Amongst Soviet ship arrivals at the Cuban ports, US intelligence analysts began to receive a lot of Human Intelligence concerning increased Soviet activity in Cuba. In order to deceive the US intelligence agencies, the Soviets leaked reports concerning the missile deployment to the media. Some of the reports leaked by the Soviets came from questionable sources. Thus, US intelligence experts dismissed many of the reports due to a lack of credibility. [Hansen, 2002]

The Soviets even went to great lengths to mask their operations while in Cuba, specifically communications between the Soviet military headquarters in Havana and units in the field had to be made in person, not written or sent by radio. Except for very brief hook-ups and equipment tests, Soviet troops maintained total radio silence in order to mask their identity, location, and troop strength from US intelligence.[ Gribkov and Smith, 1994]

In late 1962, the United States knew that the Soviets were up to something in Cuba but did not know the full extent of the operation. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin assured US Secretary of State Robert F. Kennedy that the Soviets had no intentions of placing offensive missiles in Cuba. Ambassador Dobrynin told Robert F. Kennedy that the Soviet troop deployment to Cuba was not of any significance [Kennedy,