Is It Justified to Kill an Innocent Threat in Defence

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However, Otsuka (1994) argues there are no moral difference between Innocent Threat and a bystander. He believes that it is not justifiable to kill innocents in self-defence. In saying so, he also believes that it is morally impermissible to kill an innocent threat.

Otsuka’s theory becomes problematic because he believes you serve a moral obligation to not move, resulting in being killed as the fat man fall on you. This would be rejected by the majority. Thus, this implication serves the notion that this theory requires additional consideration of approaches such as traditional restrictions of self-defence. He believes that Bystanders and Innocent Aggressor/Threat share the same moral aspect, as they both don't have the responsibility agent in the case of the Falling Fat Man. Given that they don't have the responsibility, they should be treated equal in terms of morals. Given that you are not allowed to kill the other, the other neither can kill you (Otsuka 1994:86-91). It was stated previously that Thomson believes that the Bystanders and Innocent Aggressor/Threat are no morally equal; instead, he believes they have moral differences.

Similarly, Otsuka believe that the traditional restrictions of self-defence is not sufficient as it does not mention the moral responsibility required in such case, thus he does not support whether it is justifiable to kill an Innocent Threat in self-defence.

In cases regarding the defence of more than one person, I will be using preference utilitarian’s theories such as Singer’s, where in order to gain maximum utility. The policy that is adopted is permitting people to use proportionate force to remove threats to their lives. Consider this: person A could use potentially lethal force against person B if B’s actions pose an imminent threat to A’s life, and this threat cannot be deflected. This is an example of necessity, proportionality and imminence where utilitarians view compliments the idea of traditional limitations as it would yield a better consequence. I would like to emphasize the importance of bringing about the best consequences in a utilitarian view. In cases whether killing an Innocent threat in defence of others (more than one person) is justifiable, Utilitarian will say that it is permissible as saving more than one valuable lives yields maximum utility than saving just one life. Therefore, it is permissible to kill a person in order to defend others regardless of the innocence of the threat.

In conclusion, this essay has shown the permissibility to kill an innocent threat in defence of either oneself or others by reviewing ideas and theories by Philosophers. This essay explored whether it was justifiable to kill an innocent threat in defence of oneself through the use of ideas such as the traditional restrictions on self-defence and the doctrine of double effect. In cases of defending more than one person, the use of preference utilitarianism was applied in order to gain an understanding of the permissibility to kill an innocent threat in defence of others.

Reference:

Handfield, T. (ed.), Life, Death and Morality Study Guide, Monash, 2014: 33-34

Otsuka, M. (1994) ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter, 1994), pp. 74-94.

Thomson, J. (1991) ‘Self-Defense’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 283-310

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