The Desire Satisfaction Theory of Wellbeing Is Implausible.

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Sumner (1996, p.129) argues that desires are always prospective, as the only desires which can be fulfilled are future-looking. Implicit to a desire is the expectation that this state of affairs would be good for a person. However, this expectation can be disappointed after the experience of the desired state of affairs. Sumner gives the example of a person choosing between two different careers, in which he makes a well-informed and rational decision and chooses one of the careers. His experience of the career is as he expected it to be in terms of the nature of that career. However, he realises that this life is not for him and although he has satisfied his desire to follow this career, he is miserable. In this case, the state of affairs he desired has entered his experience, but his experience of this state of affairs has been negative. This is the result of the gap between his expectation before the state of affairs and his actual experience of the state of affairs, and this disappointment is due to the prospectivity of desires.

One further problem with desire satisfactionism is the implication that experiences are only good for a person if they were desired. One example of an experience which appears to contradict this might be unexpectedly watching a sunset, or hearing a song. The desire satisfactionist appears to claim that these experiences are not good for a person. Although this is a minor example which might not actually be particularly valuable to a person’s life overall, there are many more long-term states of affairs which seem to contribute to wellbeing that desire satisfaction would omit, such as an unexpected pregnancy and the subsequent joys of parenting. The desire satisfactionist might attempt to allow for this by suggesting that this unexpected experience fulfils other desires, such as the desire for a family in the latter case or the desire to see pleasant sights and hear nice music in the former cases. However, there must be a reason why a person would have these desires and the satisfaction of these desires would be good for them. By explaining why this would benefit a person, the desire satisfactionist must concede that what makes a life go well for a person is not good for them because they desired it, but because of the worth of the thing they desired. If certain things have prudential value outside of being desired, ‘desire’ becomes an unnecessary feature and desire satisfactionism becomes a disguised objective list theory.

On balance, the desire satisfaction is initially appealing and able to effectively respond to a number of objections without losing its internalist appeal. However, desires can be informed and rational and yet the occurrence of the desired state of affairs still not contribute to a person’s wellbeing. Furthermore, certain states of affairs can contribute to a person’s wellbeing without being desired. Therefore, the satisfaction of desires is an insufficient account of what makes a life go well for the person who lives it and so desire satisfactionism is not a plausible theory of wellbeing.

References:

Heathwood, p. 135-147 in Fletcher, G (ed.) 2015, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being.

Sumner, L. W. Welfare, Happiness, And Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

Peter Railton, Moral realism in Philosophical Review 95 (2): (1986)