Mission Command - 1st Battle of the Marne

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Moltke lacked the ability to make deliberate decisions and take the risks necessary to lead in combat. A German staff officer said of him, “he practiced an exaggerated restraint, because he lacked all self-assurance and thus all self-confidence, he was afraid to lead by himself.”3 Often indecisive and overcautious he had no ability to direct his forces. This lack of timely or clear direction caused his forces to misalign themselves on the battlefield leading to the need for a general withdrawal to defensive positions and the failure of the operation as a whole. Unable to assess the shortcomings of his plan and the actions within the operational environment the changes made led to the failure of the mission rather than the success.

Morgan states, “Moltke’s lack of decisiveness was a classic example of why the insecure, overly reflective man cannot be an effective operational commander.4 As a combatant commander, Moltke fails in every principle of the commander’s role of mission command warfighting function. His overcautious nature caused a failure to understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment, while his constant indecisiveness made it impossible to lead, direct, and assess his forces in battle. Moltke was well aware of his shortcomings and even vocal about them, however Wilhelm II selected him over qualified commanders with combat experience. For this reason, the blame for the failing at the Marne and in World War I should rest more with the Emperor than with a General who was ill suited to be a combatant commander.

Endnotes:

1. Correlli, Barnett, The Sword Bearers (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1986), 16.

2. Forrest, Holmes Jr. “The Schlieffen Plan: Case History of the Relations of Military Strategy to National Security Policy.” US Army War College, (1972): 14.

3. Ian, Sumner, The First Battle of the Marne 1914. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2010), 84.

4. Barbara P, Morgan. “Operational Leadership: A Case Study of Helmuth von Moltke “the Younger”.”US Naval War College, (2001): 16.

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Bibliography:

Barnett, Correlli. The Sword Bearers. London: Hodder and Stoughton Llimited, 1986.

Holmes Jr, Forrest S. "The Schlieffen Plan: Case History of the Relation of Military Strategy to National Security Policy." US Army War College, 1972: 14.

Morgan, Barbara P. "Operational Leadership: A Case Study of Helmuth von Moltke "the Younger"." US Naval War College, 2001: 16.

Sumner, Ian. The First Battle of the Marne 1914. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2010.