The Long Shadow of the People’s Liberation Army on China’s Foreign Policy

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Graph 2- Source: SIPRI database

Nevertheless, given the sheer size of the economy, China is now the second largest country by military spending after the US, and the PLA enjoys latest technology capabilities, such as fifth generation stealth fighters, hypersonic DH-10 cruise and DF-15 ballistic missiles. This equipment, coupled with the Second Artillery Corps nuclear deterrence and the increased capabilities of PRC’s navy -including over 60 anti-ship missiles-armed submarines, 17 fully equipped frigates, 5 Type D destroyers and the first of a battle group of aircraft carriers, the Liaoning (Chase, 2015)- attempts to establish an A2/AD (Anti Access-Area Denial) strategy against the US power projection. This concept can be explained as the effort in restricting the ability of the US to deploy its advantages (Singh, 2013). In other words, China aims at impeding quick, agile access to opponents’ forces in case of any military operation in the area, recognizing that the full deployment of US vessels and aircraft would still be overwhelming in any longer dispute.

Impact of PLA on China’s foreign policy

International relations in the 21st century rely on a delicate balance of hard and soft powers among an increasing number of players. There is a strong temptation to wear only the economic lenses and infer international foreign policies from these rudimental findings. Unsurprisingly, this abstraction exercise often delivers satisfactory results and the dependence of geopolitics on resources and flow of goods and information has never been more clearly underpinned. However, the development of PLA strength is one of the key ingredients of the hard power approach that is able to harness or foster the rise of China as a superpower in a somehow old-fashioned, yet still true perception, following a pattern closely related to economic growth but characterized by its own specificity. While it is still early to capture the full scope and consequences of the restructuring, the geopolitical implications are huge and already visible.

Firstly, the development of the PLA it is an indisputable fact, rather than a threatening eventuality. So far, it has delivered a stalemate effect, which in other words could be perceived as a stable situation for some years. While tension builds up in the South China Sea, it seems an outrageous statement, but looking at the stakes of the parties involved and at the slow yet steady approach the PLA has been enforcing, it is possible to infer such prediction from this complex scenario. The global superiority of the US army is still undisputed, yet the PLA is now believed to be strong enough to match regionally the hard power show-off that the US has been imposing in every sea (Nixon, 2015). Here emerges the ambivalence of the US “neutrality” on the matter, inevitably biased by an interdependence of interests that allows no straightforward solution, hence a greater “balance” from an outside perspective. On one side, the US condemns unilateral claims enforced by China and sends vessels in the area to protect the freedom of transit, adhering to its historical commitments. On the other, they call for an increased military-to-military dialogue with China, “enhancing risk reduction measures that diminish potential incidents or miscalculations” (US OSD, 2015), especially considering that the forecasted US relative decline dissuades from implementing a unipolar approach (Nye, 2010). In fact, despite boastful quotes, the prudential approach taken by the US navy, which has interfered only marginally with Chinese operations, in spite of evident proofs of Chinese military facilities in the Spratlys Islands (Lee, 2015), leaves only one possible explanation, such as the US acknowledging and freeing the way for the role of the PLA in the area. Although South East Asian nations feel concerned about China’s rise, surprised by Beijing’s interpretation of “peaceful” in this context, the US envision a tighter cooperation with China and seek at limiting Beijing’s expansion while preserving the status quo. Sea power theories hark back at least to Mahan’s nineteenth century work, but while this old geopolitics framework seems not to decay, the US and China may reinterpret it in a modern version, capturing the value of free seas access without postulating the need of a sole hegemonic power in charge of ensuring it. Therefore, the overall conflict prevention capability of the PLA, at the expenses of superficial tensions while settling a new equilibrium, could fit into the mutual interests of Beijing and Washington in the immediate future, allowing both parties to seek further benefits in other areas of the relationship.

Unfortunately, the matter becomes much more intricate when projecting this approach in the medium term. Assuming a constant increase in PLA military capabilities, PRC’s foreign policy would impact a pivotal point in a 5 to 7 years’ time horizon. Given the constant growth in military expenditures, the downsizing trend in the total amount of personnel and the investments in cutting-edge military technology, both acquired by suppliers and developed internally, the PLA would realistically be in the position of having established an effective A2/AD covering the whole national borders and the claimed sea territories. Any attempt to expand PLA effectiveness beyond this theoretical limit would entail an interest in projecting power over foreign lands and seas, reversing China’s long-lasting official foreign policy commitment. The PLA power would reinforce the credibility of any China’s attempt to expand its influence in a more coercive manner, causing a domino effect on a global scale.

Another scenario would materialize if China ended its 30 year long run-up in military expenditures, settling to a level sufficient solely to exercise control on regional areas. Beijing’s decision on size and capability of the PLA will tip the balance, causing a subsequent chain reaction affecting the whole politics of the next decade. These two alternatives are now analyzed to understand the likely outcomes on the global geopolitics landscape.

Assertive position

Whether Beijing will scale the issue or not depends strictly on the willingness to beam its authority on the whole continent end even beyond, fulfilling a traditional Sinocentric view of the world and generating a feedback effect on latent nationalism. This effort would be testified to by an increase in size and quality in some sectors of PLA such as the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious assault ships and cyber-warfare development. The commitment to improve exponentially this bundle of

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