Economic Aspects of Indo-Pak Wars
Autor: Mikki • September 5, 2018 • 3,161 Words (13 Pages) • 681 Views
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Pakistan’s domestic politics was quite fragile after Ayub Khan narrowly won the Presidential election on 2nd January 1965. Now, General Ayub Khan was quite confident of winning as being in power since the 1958 ‘bloodless coup’, he had amended constitution in his favor. But his opposition was Miss Fatima Jinnah, the elderly sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and was quickly gaining ground. In the end, despite heavy vote rigging, Miss Jinnah lost by just 10,000 odd votes. So, Ayub wanted to recover lost political legitimacy by achieving a resounding military victory against India.
Major Players:
- Pakistan: One of the two parties directly involved in the war, Pakistan initiated the conflict to capitalize on the low morale of Indian Army which was humiliated in 1962 Sino-India war.
- India: Taken by surprise, India initially adopted a defensive posture and tried to limit its losses. But later in the war, it gained the upper hand employing commendable tactical genius.
- China: It was a major safeguard in Pakistan’s plans kept as insurance in case India gained an upper hand. And, as expected China threatened to open a second front on its border with India forcing the later to tone down aggression.
- UK and US: These were the major western powers which acted as mediators and led efforts to end the war swiftly. Acting through the UN Security Council, their primary motive was to see Pakistan get out of the war without getting humiliated and battered.
- Russia: Arguably the only major world power that India had on her side. Embroiled in the Cold War aggressively, Russia chose to remain a passive observer to the world but pulled a lot of strings through back-channels. It was India’s insurance against any Chinese aggression and was the chief architect in the Tashkent Declaration of Peace.
Major Personalities:
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Ayub Khan (Pakistan President)
The war, though not Ayub Khan’s brainchild, was surely backed by the Pakistani President. But his tactics and timings were quite controversial even in Pakistani military circles, with him being accused of favoritism even during the fighting. One peculiar instance was when a successful capture of Akhnoor was prevented by sudden change in the top leadership of the Army division that was mounting the attack.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan Foreign Minister)
Mr. Bhutto was convinced that Kashmir was ripe for taking and was the chief architect of Operation Gibraltar.
U Thant (UN Secretary General)
With tensions high elsewhere due to cold war, UN was anxious to see another front opening up in South-Asia. So after bringing about the Kutch Agreement, U Thant actively pressured both countries to end the increasingly violent war in September urgently. He personally travelled to the two warring nations on 9th and 13th September to hold high-level peace-talks.
Harold Wilson (British P.M.)
Wilson was the most involved and concerned of all international leaders. During the early-phase of Kutch standoff, when rest of the world was following a wait-and-watch policy, he got into the act quickly and wrote to heads of both India and Pakistan offering to mediate peace-negotiations.
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Brigadier Zoru Bakshi (Indian Army)
He is credited with making one the most momentous tactical decisions that proved to be a huge turning point in the war. Commanding the 68 Brigade under 19th Division, he was tasked to capture Bedouri first and then Haji Pir Pass- the crossing Pakistan was using to carry out infiltrations into Kashmir. But Pakistan got a whiff of this impending Indian attack and started to fortify the pass. Brigadier Bakshi realized that with every second passing, chances of capturing Haji Pir were diminishing rapidly. So he unilaterally decided, circumventing his superiors, to skip Bedouri altogether and attack the pass directly. This proved to be critical as he was successful and that meant Pakistan had lost crossing vital for the success of its operation.
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YB Chavan (India Defence Minister)
Being the defence minister, Chavan was understandably in the thick of things and with the war developing rapidly had to take many crucial decisions unilaterally without waiting for council. One worth mentioning was when Pakistan unexpectedly launched Operation Grand Slam just a day after losing Haji Pir Pass. Now as Indian Army was severly underprepared for any such eventuality and was in danger of being mauled by the Pakistani thrust, Chavan authorized use of air-strikes in the region expanding scope of the war.
Lal Bahadur Shastri (Indian P.M.)
Though soft-spoken and diminutive, Lal Bahadur was a resolute man when it came to dealing with Pakistan. Pakistan realized this the hard way when he flatly rejected to accept its demands in Kutch even though India was on defensive in the region. While Pakistan was relying on his perceived tepidness to keep the conflict limited, he didn’t take much time to authorize Indian Army to cross the international border and attack Lahore.
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Major events:
Pre-War Escalation:
JANUARY 1965 - After months of increased trespassing activity in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan makes a bold move and captures Kanjarkot inside Indian Territory.
FEBRUARY-APRIL – Indian Army bids to recapture Kajarkot via Operation Kabaddi. Calling it an attack on its sovereignty, Pakistan retaliates by launching Desert Hawk II.
APRIL-JUNE – Ceasefire to take affect from 1st July is agreed upon and both sides agree to return to positions as on 1st January 1965.
The 22-day war:
AUGUST 5 – Emboldened by its success in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan sent over 30,000 men across the LOC in Jammu & Kashmir to destabilize the region under operation Gibraltar.
SEPTEMBER 1- After utter failure of operation Gibraltar, Pakistan decides to take its offensive to the next level and involves its regular military under operation Grand Slam.
Faced with severe pressure and humiliation in J&K
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