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2016 Election - Bong Bong Marcos

Autor:   •  August 23, 2018  •  1,299 Words (6 Pages)  •  201 Views

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the national board of canvassers (NBOC), where the results for national positions are canvassed. The MBOC and PBOC also separately beam ERs to the central server.

As we all know, vote counting machine is not a solution to election offense such as vote buying. In fact, VCM cannot prevent it from happening but it may be used as a tool if the controls for the misuse of voting receipts are not strictly implemented by BEI members. Candidates can verify and validate if the voters they paid voted the candidates they agreed.VCM is configured to recognize and accept only ballots customized and pre-assigned to a precinct. One of the outstanding features of the VCMs is the capability to scan the shaded ballots, encrypt those images, and store them in the VCM’s SD (secure digital) cards. So, apart from the physical ballots, there are scanned copies of the same ballots. This security feature was meant to prevent the scenario in manual elections where losing candidates who file election protests would “operate” the ballots. Cheats usually put invalidating marks on the physical ballots that bore the names of opponents, and put their names, post-election, on blank spaces despite the voters’ intent to abstain. This new feature has been very effective in detecting post-election tampering by simply comparing the physical ballots with their scanned images. VCMs can receive only a specified number of ballots, equivalent to the number of registered voters in that precinct. Any ballots fed in excess of the pre-determined number of ballots, or those ballots coming from other precincts, will be rejected by the VCM. With this security feature, candidates cannot add ballots that are not registered in a certain precinct as ballots are precinct-specific. VCM has no capability of distinguishing voters and verifying if they are indeed registered voters in a particular precinct. A voter can vote for the entire barangay, of course in connivance with BEI. VCM lacks biometric detection; it opens the system to double voting. Had there been a Voter Verification System (VVS), once a voter has voted, subsequent attempts by the same person will be rejected by the machine. In this year election, preventing double voting would be up to the BEI and the vigilance of the watchers. VCMs have audit logs or audit trails. It is a security-relevant chronological record of all specific operation, procedure, or event affecting a VCM. It serves as documentary evidence of the sequence of activities of the VCMs, noting details like the time they were turned on and off, the exact time they read the ballot, commands entered by the operators, and all cases of ballot rejection. VCMs print precinct election returns prior to transmission. Hacking of the electronic results has been a public concern with regard to the VCMs. Election results are transmitted and canvassed by level. Results are transmitted from one level to another. Theoretically speaking, if the transmitted results are substituted through hacking, the printed election returns at the precinct level maybe used to question or dislodge the hacked result received by the MBOC/CBOC. This is the reason why it is important for the watchers to secure at all times copies of these election returns at the precinct level.

Furthermore, I want to emphasize that tampering VCMs would be more likely the least preferred option by the candidates because of the complexity of the machines and they are detectable. I believe that election cheaters would rather buy votes or exploit voters instead of manipulating VCMs.


How to prevent cheating with the vote-counting machines. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2016, from

How does the PH automated election system work? (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2016, from


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