Subjects and Constructs

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they think black women should be doing or the type of writing they believe will sell” (29-30). Her use of “black women” instead of just “black” or “woman” emphasizes that black women do face a special situation unique to them, and them alone. They cannot be represented by a monolithic female Subject, because their identities encompass more than just gender.

Other feminist theorists, like Rosi Braidotti, believe that women should throw aside the notion of a universal, neutral subjectivity and instead reclaim their distinctly female subjectivities in order to own their difference. Sexual difference is an imperative part of the feminist cause, because there is always the danger of denying or ignoring the experience of being a woman, or of denigrating “feminine” characteristics that are stigmatized by society, in favor of assuming more celebrated “masculine” attributes. Braidotti encourages women to recognize and embrace their own sexual difference and to avoid trying to become like men (the “ideal”) to acquire equality. Assimilation into “masculine” modes of thought would only be counter-productive in a society that has silenced “feminine” voices for centuries.

However, therein arises a problem – “How can ‘we feminists’ uphold both the need to assert the sexual-specificity of the female subject and the deconstruction of the traditional notions of the subject, which are based on phallocentric premises” (Braidotti 92)? This is the same issue faced by Butler, except that instead of dismissing the existing framework and its concept of subjectivity completely, Braidotti advocates the re-structuring and re-examination of both. The body, as the root of female subjectivity, is a problematic site for the formation of a new subjectivity because it is at once biological and social, natural and cultural, reproductive and sexual, and tied up in heteronormative ideas about family (Braidotti 97). It is tied up in a knot of pre-existing systems that are oppressive, and also brings up essentialist arguments that are typically anathema to feminists. However, it is necessary that the female subjectivity should make reference to the corporeal and the body, that women should assert “I, woman, think and therefore I say that I, woman, am” (Braidotti 100). The establishment of this female bond is the first step to developing a new female subjectivity. Furthermore, it is not necessary for women to put aside their ethnic, class, or sexual identities in order to participate – they need only to acknowledge their existence as women, and then other differences can be raised and taken into account. In this case, sex does not eclipse or subsume any other identities that a person may have. It is simply a part of the whole.

In the “Introduction” of Sexual Difference by The Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective, it is similarly argued that community and recognition of womanhood are integral to the feminist movement. Jane Austen, Emily Dickinson, and Madame du Deffand are all cited as prime examples of the “mental vigor that a woman can acquire by associating with her fellow women” (MWBC 29), and “every time a woman’s great demands and achievements have been united to the knowledge of sexual difference, we find that she had recourse to another woman as a point of reference” (MWBC 32). Thus, the bonds between women become a precursor to female achievement. This dovetails perfectly with Braidotti’s assertion that women need to develop a sense of female community and subjectivity in order to effect change. Without that community, there is a definite lack of support, a loss of feminine identity, a sort of Diaspora or scattering that divides and weakens the lot of women as a whole. This connects to what Beauvoir says about women being mixed in with men as their mothers, wives, daughters, etc. and feeling closer ties to those men than to other women as a main obstacle to developing a female subjectivity.

All of these feminist viewpoints, which address the process of becoming a woman and the formation of a female subjectivity, are valid to some extent. Butler’s argument against the Subject and its framework is very compelling, but I feel that it would be ineffective in immediate practice. She is right in some respects -- expecting fifty percent of the population to live under the same definition of “woman” and to bond under that pretext is presumptuous and idealistic. It is more likely that subgroups will form – “African-American women,” “lesbian women,” “middle-class women,” and so forth. However, her call for feminists to step outside of the existing system seems impossible in the current political climate. From birth, we are conditioned by whichever system produced us, and then we have to generate change in a society that values and lives by that system. Perhaps Butler’s recommendations may serve as the seeds for a long-term overhaul of how we think about gender and politics, but they are not viable at the present. However, further development of this theory would definitely be enlightening for future (and hopefully more advanced) generations. In contrast, Braidotti’s appeal that women should revel in their sexual difference and create bonds along those lines is something that seems more specific and applicable to the current situation, but remains limited in terms of real, long-term change. Of course, it remains valuable for women to reclaim their sex differences as positive and to take pride in their identities as women. MWBC’s emphasis on strong relationships between women is also important, especially in the current cultural climate, where women are socialized to compete and belittle each other in a bid for male approval. And lastly, while Beauvoir’s concept of “women” as being grounded in common solidarity is idealistic and impractical, her observations on what it means to “become” a woman are invaluable. Ideally, we – as politically and socially conscious feminists – should critically examine all of these theories, and come away with a better understanding of how to approach gender and the experience of womanhood in the world.

Works Cited

1. Beauvoir, Simone de. The Second Sex. 2. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.

2. Braidotti, Rosi. Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis. 1. New York: Routledge, 1989.

3. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. 1. New York: Routledge, 1990.

4. Hooks, Bell. Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics. 1. Boston: South End Press, 1990.

5. Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference. 1. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.