Colombia - Addicted to War

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The international scrutiny on the drug traffickers allowed for FARC to operate somewhat uninhibited. The U.S. pressure on the Colombian government to deal with the Medellin cartel forced the National Police and Colombian Armed Forces to direct most of their resources at fighting Escobar, and FARC was able to continue business as usual, growing in number and financial power.[13]

The government was, however, continuously trying to hold peace talks with FARC, but saw little success from these attempts. In the waning months of 1990 the government was so frustrated with the lack of negotiations that they sent the army, with no notice, to Casa Verde, a compound which housed the National Secretariat of FARC, and assassinated him. All peace talks were terminated at this point, and FARC became more aggressive in their political demonstrations. Kidnappings, localized bombings, hijackings and sabotaging key government facilities all became more common.[14]

In 1998 the country was in a state of chaos. Attacks were widespread and frequent, unemployment was skyrocketing and the guerrillas and paramilitary groups had gained more power. Newly elected president, Andres Pastrana Arango, who believed significant change was required, began pursuing new peace talks and was so desperate to reach some agreements that he conceded a 51,000 square kilometer demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the region where FARC and government controlled land met. The DMZ was granted with the sole purpose of getting FARC to the negotiation table. The plan did not have the desired outcomes as FARC used this new land to expand their drug production and transport military equipment and supplies.[15]

The election of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez in 2002 saw yet another increase in conflict. The president, with significant military aid from the United States, began pushing FARC further away from the urban centers. The president saw success in his efforts and was able to achieve re-election in a large part due to his campaign against FARC. However, complete victory was beyond his reach as the guerrilla group had been able to assemble a powerful resistance force with the money made through its illicit drug production, ransoms from kidnappings, robberies and extortion.[16] It is estimated that FARC profits were more than $300 million per year.[17]

FARC remained powerful in the rural south of the country, where they historically had dominance. With the significant income through their illicit economic activity and enhanced recruiting tactics the guerrillas were able to build their strength up. FARC continued their assault and in 2006, implemented ‘Plan Resistencia’, a final military push to combat the president’s aggressive tactics. The plan’s strategic mission was to undermine the perception of a secure Colombia by engaging in urban warfare and strategic attacks.[18] These efforts lasted for five years, but finally came to an end when armed national forces breached FARC’s security and communication infrastructure and killed two of the five senior FARC leaders.[19]

In 2012 FARC stated that they would no longer be involved in kidnapping civilians, and began a process of scaling down their military action. FARC’s primary tactical response would be small scale ambushes on key government run infrastructures, such as the energy grid and telecommunications units.[20] FARC even established a two month unilateral ceasefire agreement as a measure of good faith, hoping that the government would follow suit and an official bilateral agreement could be made. The government did not agree to the ceasefire, and the peace was short-lived.[21]

Currently the conflict is in new rounds of peace negotiation. These talks are being held in Havana, Cuba and have seen very mixed results. Further exploration of this dialogue will be examined in this paper’s “Levels of Ripeness” section, as well as the “Proposal” section.

The Drug Trade

As previously mentioned, FARC began funding its military campaign through the production of illegal drugs in the late 1970’s. FARC’s goal was never to produce and traffic illegal drugs internationally, but rather to create a means of funding their movement. The formal decision to support the cultivation and production of coca took place at the Seventh Guerilla Conference in 1982.[22] This decision demonstrated a crucial shift that would further alienate the guerilla forces from the national government.

Initially the FARC was opposed to coca because of its subversive nature and its exploitation by free market trafficker. However, the revenue that was coming from the initial districts convinced the leadership to protect coca farmers and charge them a gramaje (farm tax)…The entrance into the drug trade has been widely cited in the literature for its role in the FARC’s expansion both geographically and in terms of their capabilities.[23]

The significance of this shift cannot be overstated. FARC’s decision to enter the drug trade was to sacrifice their moral beliefs, even some of the causes they were fighting for, in order to be able to fund their war campaign. Many argue that without this shift FARC would not have been able to oppose the government, and entering the drug trade was a survival mechanism[24]. Regardless, the Seventh Guerilla Conference marks a critical change, beginning to move FARC’s battle from one based on ideology, to one of economic expansion and conquest.[25]

The need to fund their efforts should not be overlooked. In Paul Collier’s study on civil war he notes that it is not a rebel groups lofty causes and desires for political change that sustain a rebellion, but the ability to finance a war effort.[26] Without a viable income a rebel group will quickly cease to threaten the national government. Evidence of this can be found when observing the timeline in Colombia’s war. Before the shift to the drug trade for substantial funding, FARC was primarily maintaining a defensive posture.[27] Robberies and kidnapping provided enough funding to survive, but not to expand. The revenue source provided through the production of narcotics gave FARC the ability to purchase more weapons, enhance communication systems, recruit more members, and even send some members of their force to the Soviet Union and Vietnam to receive training at a military academy.[28] FARC was now able to expand its reach throughout Colombia and begin to spread their influence to a wider audience. Their geographic control over the country also continuously grew. At their peak, FARC controlled approximately 40 – 50% of the land in Colombia, primarily in the Southern regions and consisted of 10,000 – 18,000 armed forces.[29]

The drug boom in the 1980’s saw