Roper Vs Simmons

Roper v. Simmons

Ivan Nunez

Southeastern University

Roper v. Simmons

The case of Roper v. Simmons can be viewed as a perfect example of how the role of the Supreme Court continues to evolve and how the sources that are often used in the deciding of these types of cases can often bring into question that decision that is reached and how controversy both in support and against a decision can begin.  While in my opinion I support the Supreme Court’s decision about protecting juveniles in the United States, there must be a substantial law to backup the ruling, which I am unsure is present in this case.  In the ruling of this case the Supreme Court did not use a combination of any foreign policy, moral decency, or state laws as a legal foundation for the decision finding.  None of these sources in this case provided any constitutional basis in this case.  The sources which were utilized in this case for deciding the constitutionality of the case were based on the Constitution and Federal Statutes.  While the Supreme Court tied in loosely the eighth amendment clause of “cruel and unusual” punishment there is not substantial backing supporting this decision. The Supreme Court with this case decided to not utilize their power to over turn the verdict issues in the previous case of Stanford v. Kentucky, which was issued fifteen years earlier surrounding the same issue.  Instead, the court stated that the prevailing moral basis had altered therefore they had changed their opinion on the case.  The real issue with this is that neither any laws or the Constitution had changed in the past fifteen years, and hence the debate of how the evolving and revolving personal viewpoints of the Supreme Court come into play.  The issue with the ruling of Roper v. Simmons was that the Supreme Court used the case to create law based on a grouping of invalid sources and personal opinions.  The ruling of Roper v. Simmons continued the controversy of issuing the sentence of death to juvenile offenders.

This case involved Chris Simmons who at the time was seventeen years old when he committed murder.  Simmons entered the home of woman named Shirley Crook.  Simmons preceded to tie up the Crook family, and in the end proceeded to toss her off a bridge after covering her face with duct tape.  She was found drowned in the water below.  Simmons arrest came soon after the crime, and he confessed to committing the murder to police.  Simmons had also recruited the help of a friend to help him with his crime, and even had told the friend that they “would get away with it because they were minors” (Roper v. Simmons, 2004).  The premise that Simmons used in his argument was that because he was a minor when he committed the crime that sentencing him to death was a violation of the eighth amendment of cruel and unusual punishment. Simmons legal team began to assert that sentencing a juvenile to death was a violation of the eighth amendment because he as a minor could be considered to have diminished culpability.  The argument was used to asset the thought that juveniles needed a lesser sentence otherwise the goals of justice were superseded by the punishment factor (Roper v. Simmons, 2004).  

The premise of the case begins when we look at the four goals of justice; deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. Therefore, it was thought that rendering ‘adult’ sentences would be considered cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence would serve no purpose as related to retribution to the juvenile being sentenced.  The Supreme Court ruled that sentencing of juveniles seventeen and under to the death penalty was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  The issue with the ruling was that fifteen years prior the court had ruled in the Stanford v. Kentucky stated that capital punishment was constitutional for those that were under eighteen if the crime justified that sentence.  The court cited a prevailing national consensus as the reason for the change of opinion of the issue.   The major issue with this ruling was using the premise that a prevailing national consensus as the reason for a change in opinion on this matter (Roper v. Simmons, 2004). Precedence indicates that one ruling may only overturn another only when the law has changed, or a grievous error has been committed, neither of which had happened since the Stanford case ruling.  Additionally, another issue with the Roper case was that the Supreme Court did not choose to overrule the Stanford case, they asserted that the times had changed and therefore the law must also be changed. Though the real problem was that the sources that the Supreme Court used to backup their assertion that the national consensus had changed were not founded.

The first source that was utilized in this ruling was that surrounding international policy and the expectations associated.  Two sources were used to assert that there was an international consensus against the capital punishment of juveniles.  The first, was based on Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Harvard Law Review Association, 2005).  This article stated that juvenile executions should be prohibited.  The second source used as a basis for this ruling was that the United Kingdom abolished laws of juvenile execution decades prior.  When writing the opinion of Justice Kennedy, he asserted that the ‘tide had turned against capital punishment of juvenile’.  He used this argument for the assertion that juvenile capital punishment should be considered cruel and unusual punishment (Harvard Law Review Association, 2005).  The issue with using this international policy to dictate United States Supreme Court rulings is that the role of judiciary representatives to base rulings on the constitutionality of issues based on the United States Constitution.  While international law may be relevant in some cases, this was not one that should have considered the actions of other countries.  The evaluation of foreign affairs is beyond the scope of the Supreme Court which was outlined in the Constitution.  Article III Section II of the constitution states “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects” (US Constitution Article III, Section II).  The Roper v Simmons case is a domestic based case arising on the issue of constitutionality of the juvenile capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and has no concern for foreign policy and related rulings.  The second source that justices used to justify this ruling in Roper v. Simmons was the popular consensus of the morality of juvenile capital punishment.  The premise of this was that most of the population finds that juvenile capital punishment is abhorrent (Myers, 2006).  This argument is that the statistics do not agree when reviewed.  The number of states that allow capital punishment are thirty-two with only eighteen that do not allow capital punishment (Death Punishment Information Center, 2013).  The number of states allowing capital punishment is nearly twice of those that don’t, just questioning how a national consensus exists in not supporting capital punishment.  This is best understood when we look at the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia; “We have held that this determination should be based on “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction”—namely, “statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.” Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 370 (1989).  As in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 312 (2002), the Court dutifully recites this test and claims halfheartedly that a national consensus has emerged since our decision in Stanford, because 18 States—or 47% of States that permit capital punishment—now have legislation prohibiting the execution of offenders under 18, and because all of four States have adopted such legislation since Stanford. See ante, at 11. Words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus. See Atkins, supra, at 342–345 (SCALIA, J.) (Roper v. Simmons, 2004)”.